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Abstract 
Oil and gas contracts with the long-term characteristic are the scene of colliding between international oil 
companies’ interests and host government’s interests. This characteristic could make such contracts vulnerable to 
unpredictable political, economic and legislative changes at the time of conclusion. Therefore, the contracting 
parties tend to use mechanisms to protect the economic balance they have reached from the conclusion until 
completing the contract. Contractual clauses are an effective mechanism to maintain the economic balance, various 
contractual clauses have been devised, of which stabilisation and renegotiation clauses are prominent types. This 
article aims to examine and evaluate the stabilisation and renegotiation clauses in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region oil 
and gas contracts. It elaborates on the concept and consequences of these clauses and provides a comparison of 
the clauses in the different countries’ oil and gas contracts. The research methods adopted in this article, include 
comparative analysis methods and the research is conducted through extensive study of the relevant literature. The 
principal finding from this study is the existence of deficiencies and shortcomings in stabilisation and renegotiation 
clauses within the Iraqi Kurdistan production sharing contracts. It is suggested that the Kurdistan Regional 
Government should review such clauses for its future oil and gas contracts.  
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1. Introduction  
Oil and gas contracts are long-term contracts and need huge capital investment. In the duration of these contracts, 
sometimes, circumstances, economic, and government changes lead to disputes. Therefore, oil and gas contracts 
contain some clauses to prevent and resolve disputes. To avoid disputes, there are a lot of clauses in different 
names that a host government and an International Oil Company (IOC) can insert in their contracts. This article 
considers and discusses the inclusion of the stabilisation and renegotiation clauses as essential contractual clauses 
for the prevention and resolution of disputes in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq’s (KRI) oil and gas contracts and 
compares them with some countries’ oil and gas contracts. For this purpose, the article provides an overview of 
stabililsation and renegotiation clauses and clarifies the differences between them. It also highlights the most 
important points in order to draft effectively the clauses. For comparison of the clauses of KRI’s oil and gas 
contracts, mainly Indonesian and Nigerian as well as some other countries’ oil and gas contracts are taken.    
    
2. Stabilisation Clauses in KRI’s Oil and Gas Contracts 
Stabilisation clauses are absolutory crucial in oil and gas contracts, particularly for oil and gas companies. These 
clauses are founded to protect oil and gas companies during the lifetime of contracts by reducing the different 
types of risks, for example, the risk of changing legislation of the host state. This section evaluates and analyses 
the stabilisation clause in KRI’s oil and gas contracts. To achieve this aim, it provides an overview of the clause 
and compression  of it in different countries’ Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs).  
 
2.1 An Overview of the Stabilisation Clause  
This sub-section defines the stabilisation clause and identifies its main types. It determines  the requirements for 
triggering the clause and its consequences as well as explaining that how to effectively draft this clause in oil and 
gas contracts.  
2.1.1 Definition of stabilisation clause      
Stabilisation clause is a way for risk mitigation to protect the oil and gas companies from various type of risks 
such as political risk1 which is the risk that the laws of the host country would change to the disadvantage of oil 
and gas companies, thus reducing the value of the investment. Stabilisation clauses are defined as “Contractual 
 
1 Mohsin Shareef Salih and Rdhwan Shareef Salih, ‘Strategy of Oil Contract Negotiation’ (2015) 6 /9 International Journal of Business and 
Social Science168 
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clauses in private contracts between investors and host States that address the issue of changes in law in the host 
State during the life of the project”.1 It also has been defined as “Contract language which freezes the provisions 
of a national system of law chosen as the law of the contract as to the date of the contract in order to prevent the 
application to the contract of any future alternations of this system”.2 
The accepted definition of this clause in oil and gas contracts in this article is that: 
the stabilisation clause is a form of governmental guarantee in a negotiated petroleum contract, which 
usually provides that the terms negotiated under the contract between a state and a foreign national will 
not be altered unilaterally or terminated by the state through the promulgation of legislation or regulation.3  
Through these definitions, it appears that stabilization clauses are significant methods to mitigate risks that face 
oil and gas companies by freezing the legislation of host countries that apply to the oil and gas contract during the 
life of the contract.  
2.1.2 Types of Stabilisation Clauses  
The insertion of particular types of stabilisation clauses in oil and gas contracts is a result of the bargaining process 
and strength of the parties and reflects a balancing of the opposite interests of the State and international oil 
company. In general, stabilisation clauses are categorised into three types which are freezing clause, economic 
equilibrium clause, and hybrid clause. 
2.1.2.1 Freezing Clause  
The classical or freezing stabilization clause restricts the power of the sovereign. It seeks to limit the exercise of 
the State’s legislative and administrative powers and prevents it from changing the contractual conditions agreed 
with the contractor to the latter’s detriment. The clause reinforces the principle of the sanctity of contracts by 
protecting the contractor against the actions of the State party. Thus, classical stabilisation clauses seek to address 
possible risks, by freezing the State’s regulatory powers and ability to unilaterally change the regime and terms 
relied upon by the Contractor in the agreement i.e. prohibiting the application of any subsequent law or regulations 
by the State. A freezing stabilisation clause is consistent with the concept of non- retroactivity of laws, which 
denies the retrospective effect of new legislation on existing contracts and maintains that the rights gained under 
such contracts or previous legislation are protected.4 
The PSC model of Mozambique provides this clause as follow: 
The Government shall not revoke or amend the Authorisation granted to ENH to explore for and produce 
Petroleum from the Contract Area without taking effective measures to ensure that such revocation or 
amendment does not affect the rights granted to the Contractor hereunder.5 
And: 
The Government will not without the agreement of the contractor exercise its legislative authority to 
amend or modify the provisions of this Agreement and will not take or permit any of its political 
subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities to take any administrative or other action to prevent or hinder 
the Contractor from enjoying the rights accorded to it hereunder. 
2.1.2.2 Economic Equilibrium Clause  
As the practice of the sovereign authority by the State party to a contract cannot be totally restricted by a classic 
stabilization clause, some techniques have been recently developed in a way that respects this reality and at the 
same time maintains the economic balance of the contract. Economic equilibrium is a modern technique and type 
of stabilisation clauses.6 In Contrast to freezing clauses, economic equilibrium clauses ensure that in the case of 
changes to the legal terms that affect the contract, it will be amended to restore the original economic equilibrium. 
In the economic equilibrium clause, the State’s practice of sovereign authority is not barred contractually. However, 
such action is counterbalanced by the clause that the economic balance of the contract as of the effective date of 
the contract will be protected throughout the lifetime of the contract.7 Economic equilibrium clauses have moved 
from traditional freezing clauses and developed a hybrid contractual mechanism combining stabilisation with 
renegotiation provisions. Thus, economic equilibrium clauses are modern stabilisation and renegotiation clauses 
at the same time. In this regard, Cameron8 noted that renegotiation clauses are frequently seen as the modern form 
of stabilisation.  
 
1  Andrea Shemberg, Stabilization Clause and Human Rights, A Research Project Conducted for IFC and the United Nations Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on Business and Human Rights . International Finance Corporation, 2009, 4 
2 Peter Cameron, Stabilisation in Investment Contracts and Changes of Rules in Host Countries: Tools for Oil & Gas Investors, Association of 
International Petroleum Negotiators, Final Report, 2006, 12 
3 Abdullah Al Faruque, ‘Stability in Petroleum Contracts: Rhetoric and Reality. (Lessons from the Experiences of Selected Developing 
Countries and Economies in Transition 1980- 2002)’ (DPhil thesis, University of Dundee 2005),95 
4 Ibid, 98 
5 Model Production Sharing Contract of Mozambique, 2001, Art 30.7(d) and (e). 
6 A. F. M. Maniruzzama, ‘The pursuit of Stability in International Energy Investment Contracts: A Critical Appraisal of the Emerging Trends’ 
(2008) 1 Journal of World Energy Law & Business 121   
7 Ibid, 126 
8 Peter Cameron, ‘In Search of Investment Stability’ in Kim Talus (ed), Research Handbook on International Energy Law (Edward Elgar 2014) 
139 
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Recently different manners of economic equilibrium clauses can be found in international oil and gas 
contracts to address the changed circumstances brought about by the unilateral acts of the State, i.e. legislative or 
regulatory, exercised in the sovereign capacity after the effective date of the contract. According to their 
achievement of economic balance, economic equilibrium clauses are classified into three categories, stipulated 
economic balance, non-specified economic balancing, and negotiated economic balancing.1 
 The Stipulated economic balance provides an automatic amendment of the contract in a stipulated way, for 
instance, the Ecuadorian model of PSC provides as follow:  
    In case of modifications to the tax regime, including the creation of new taxes, or the labor participation, 
or its interpretation, that have consequences on the economics of this Contract, a corresponding factor 
will be included in the production share percentages to absorb the increase or decrease in the tax burden 
or in the labor participation of the previously indicated contractor. This correction factor will be calculated 
between the Parties and approved by the Ministry of Energy and Mines.2   
The non-specified economic balancing, although providing for automatic amendment, does not stipulate the nature 
of such amendment, nor will it need the mutual agreement of the parties involved for such amendment. An Azeri 
production-sharing contract provides that: 
In the event that any Governmental Authority invokes any present or future law, treaty, intergovernmental 
agreement, decree or administrative order which contravenes the provisions of this Agreement or 
adversely or positively affects the rights or interests of Contractor hereunder, including, but not limited 
to, any changes in tax legislation, regulations, or administrative practice, the terms of this Agreement 
shall be adjusted to re-establish the economic equilibrium of the Parties, and if the rights or interests of 
Contractor have been adversely affected, then SOCAR shall indemnify the Contractor (and its assignees) 
for any disbenefit, deterioration in economic circumstances, loss or damages that ensue therefrom. 
SOCAR shall within the limits of its authority use its reasonable lawful endeavors to ensure that the 
appropriate Governmental Authorities will take appropriate measures to resolve promptly in accordance 
with the foregoing principles any conflict or anomaly between all such treaty, intergovernmental 
agreement, law, decree or administrative order and this Agreement.3  
The negotiated economic balancing entails the parties to meet to negotiate amendments to the contract. The Indian 
Model PSC includes the following clause: 
If any change in or to any Indian law, rule or regulation dealing with income tax or other corporate tax, 
export/import tax, excise, customs duty or any other levies, duties or taxes imposed on Petroleum or 
dependent upon the value of Petroleum results in a material change to the expected economic benefits 
accruing to any of the Parties after the date of execution of the Contract, the Parties shall consult promptly 
in good faith to make necessary revisions and adjustments to the Contract in order to maintain such 
expected economic benefits to each of the Parties, provided, however, that the expected economic benefits 
to the Parties shall not be reduced as a result of the operation of this Article.4 
2.1.2.3 Hybrid Clause  
As the name requires, a hybrid clause simply consists of a combination of the characteristic of both the freezing 
clause and the economic equilibrium clause. This type of stabilization clause entails the host State to reinstate the 
IOC to the same position it was before the change of law was made. This clause attempts to balance the State's 
interests by retaining its sovereign power of legislation and imperative of economic interest of the private party 
through adaptation and commercial adjustment of contract.5 An example of the hybrid clause can be found in a 
PSC Kazakhstan.  
Article 21  
21.1. The Tax Regime set forth in the Contract shall be permanently in effect until the expiration of the 
Term of the Contract.   
21.2. If changes are made in the law after the Contract signing data that make further observance of the 
original terms and conditions of the Contract impossible or that lead to a significant change in its general 
economic terms and conditions, the Contractor and representatives of the Competent Body and Tax 
Agencies may make changes in or correction to the Contract that are needed to restore the economic 
interests of the Parties as of the Contract signing date.  These changes in or correction to Contract terms 




2 Model PSC of October 2002 for the Exploration of Hydrocarbons & the Exploration of Crude Oil Ecuador, Art. 11.7 
3 Exploration Development and Production sharing for the Block including the Padar Area and the Adjacent Prospective Structures in the 
Azerbaijan Republic in 1999 between the State Oil Co of Azerbaijan and Kura Valley Development Co Ltd and Socar Oil Affiliate (Azerbaijan), 
Barrows (art 24.2). 
4 Indian Production Sharing Agreement Model, 2010, Art. 17.10.  
5 Al Faruque, op.cit, 101. 
6 Exploration for and production and production sharing Contract of crude hydrocarbons in the Chinarevskoye Oil and Gas-Condensate Field 
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It starts with a simple statement that the contract terms shall remain inviolable throughout the whole life of the 
contract. In addition, it says any changes accrued in the country’s general laws shall not deteriorate the contractor’s 
position. 
2.1.3 Scopes of Stabilisation clauses 
Stabilisation clauses may vary not only by the technique of stabilisation but also according to the extent of the 
stabilisation right. According to the stabilisation right, stabilisation clauses mainly are: 
2.1.3.1 Full Stabilisation Clauses: 
Full stabilisation clauses aim at complete and comprehensive protection against subsequent changes in national 
law without any restriction on the freezing of laws. In other words, a full stabilisation clause tries to completely 
protect contractual undertakings from any change of applicable law by a host state.1 These clauses in modern State 
contracts are rarely found because host States often do not accept such an unlimited clause.  
2.1.3.2 Limited Stabilisation Clauses  
Usually, host States based on their negotiating power, attempt to limit the appropriate use of the stabilisation 
clauses as much as possible. Under the limited stabilisation clause, all laws of host State will not be frozen and the 
competencies apply to specific legislation such as tax laws, labour law, the law relating to the repatriation of rights, 
and stabilisation of export-import provisions.2 The limited stabilisation clauses are more effective and preferable 
by host States and the modern oil and gas contracts indicate a preference for the usage of limited stabilisation 
clauses.   
2.1.3.3 Time-Limited Stabilisation calsuse 
In stabilisation clauses, the duration of application of the clause also can be limited. The stabilisation clause may 
apply for the whole duration of the project or the different phases of the project. In the later, the host State stabilises 
its national laws in a specific phase of the project. For example, the duration of the stabilisation clause can be 
limited for the exploration for or production of oil and gas. Such a clause can cause a win-win situation for the 
parties in the negotiation process of the oil and gas contract.     
2.1.4 Requirements for a stabilisation clause 
Requirements for triggering a stabilisation clause in oil and gas contracts can be derived from definitions of 
stabilisation clauses. Thus, the requirements in brief are: 
a) In the event of freezing clause, using the legislative and administrative powers by the State in order to 
change the contractual conditions agreed with the contractor during the life of contract. In other words 
the application of any subsequent law or regulations by the State to change the regime and terms relied 
upon by the Contractor in the contract.  
b) In the event of an economic equilibrium clause, using the sovereign authority by the State and changing 
the legal terms that affect the contract, thereby disrupting the economic balance of the contract compared 
to the effective date of the contract.   
2.1.5 Consequences of Stablisiation clause  
The consequences of stabilization clauses to a great extent depend on the particular form of the clause. Stabilization 
clauses protect the oil company’s interest against the host State’s unilateral action, either legislative or regulatory, 
that may affect the contract. These Clauses guarantee the stability of essential terms of the contract bearing upon 
the return on the private party’s investment, such as fiscal regime, labour legislation, companies’ and exchange 
control regulations.3 Stabilisation clauses prohibit expropriation or nationalization of the company’s investment. 
They preserve the contractual terms and conditions as originally agreed by the parties rather than modifying them 
in any respect. Thus, nationalisation or expropriation of oil and projects or a unilateral change or termination of 
the contract containing a stabilisation clause by the host states should be treated as an unlawful act under national 
and international law.4 
A stabilisation clause cannot stop a State from exercising its absolute right to legislate for an overriding public 
purpose, there is an overwhelming case in support of the argument that the main legal consequence of a breach 
of a stabilisation clause is the financial restriction upon the State, which signifies that compensation must be 
awarded in the case of breach of stabilisation clause.5 
 An economic stabilisation clause achieves the financial equilibrium of the contract as conceived at the time 
it was made. In this regard, the equilibrium of the contract is determinable by the different factors including 
the definition of the term itself in the contract, the surrounding circumstances, and the adjustment made by 
the parties voluntarily in the contractual relationship over the course of the contract duration. The resultant 
 
in West Kazakhstan Oblast pursuant to licence series MG no. 253D,  in 1997, between the Republic of Kazakhstan State Committee for 
Investments (the Competent Body) and Production sharing agreement between The Republic of Kazakhstan State Committee for Investments 
(the Competent Body) and the Zhaikmunai Limited Liability Partnership (the Contractor), Kazakhstan, Art.21 
1 Al Faruque, Op.Cit.,96 
2 Ibid, 97 
3 Piero Bernardini, “ Stabilisation and Adaptation in Oil and Gas Investments”(2008)1 Journal of World Energy Law & Business 98  
4 Al Faruque, op.cit, 112 
5 Ibid, 115 
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consequences for subsequent legislation affecting the economic equilibrium of the contract can be mitigated 
either by way of payment of compensation to the party or other equitable solution including modification of 
the contract terms as may be agreed by the parties.1 
2.1.6 Drafting Stabilisation Clauses  
As explained earlier, the main purpose of the stabilization clauses is to knot the hands of the host State during the 
lifetime of a project under a natural resource development contract, thus the host State cannot intervene with the 
interests of the international oil company. Drafting a stablisation clause is essential for inserting the clause in oil 
and gas contracts. Carelessness and lack of prudence and insight may result in defective and useless clauses. Thus 
drafters of these clauses should pay more attention to the drafting process to insert an effective stabilization clause 
in the contracts. 
 First of all, in order to avoid difficulties and different interpretations, the drafting language should be clear and 
precise. 
In the context of stabilisation clauses, the status of the state as a contracting party may often be disputable. In 
international oil and gas contracts, three main situations are met by international oil companies:2 
a) the national oil company (NOC)  
b) the host State itself; or  
c) both the NOC and the host State together  
To avoid problems the parties should provide unambiguously in express terms in the contract, whether the 
State company operates as a representative of the State, with all the consequences resulting from the fact that the  
State is  a party, or on the contrary as a separate entity. Identifying a company as separate from the State when it 
is a privatized company is not a problem. The role of State-owned companies as a party should be explained in the 
contract concerning any possible legal problem that may arise. Such considerations are important to the classic 
stabilisation or freezing clauses and may not extend to economic equilibrium clauses. However, the above-
mentioned problem can be overcome when freezing clauses are coupled with economic equilibrium clauses as 
they are often inserted in many modern international oil and gas contracts. When the NOC itself concluded the 
contract as a separate company with an international oil company and inserts an economic equilibrium clause, the 
above-mentioned problem of a freezing clause could be avoided.3 
- When drafting stabilization clauses in a contract with the host State, international oil companies should be careful 
that in certain countries’ stabilization clauses may sometimes be subject to restrictions imposed by the legal and 
constitutional framework of the host State. As a result, these clauses may not be enforceable and the international 
oil company will be left without the needed protection from any unilateral action by the State that might affect its 
interests.4   
-Whatever the purpose of the clause is freezing the law or establishing a system for the restoration of economic 
equilibrium, it needs to contain a clear undertaking from the host government to provide stability to the company.5  
- Parties should pay attention to the trigger of stabilization clause. The trigger is a part of the clause that controls 
the main issue of whether a qualifying event has happened. It is the entrance to relief and, as such, the way it is 
created is critical to the protection the clause ultimately gives the company. It should be assumed that the trigger 
will be heavily negotiated between the parties and its final wording will reflect a compromise. 6  Usually, 
stabilisation clauses have triggers based on a definition of change in law. However, sometimes definitions of 
change in law are considerably more complicated than this, covering changes to the way existing laws are 
interpreted or applied by the authorities of the host State. Express coverage for ‘interpretive change’ is important 
because it is often the case that stabilisation conflicts emerge not from the promulgation of new laws, but from 
changes in the way the courts and other authorities interpret and apply existing legislation. When the trigger is 
created around the existence of a legislative event, the clause will not reply to this sort of administrative or judicial 
act, in spite of this it may be just as damaging as the enactment of a new statute. 7In drafting the clause, the changes 
arising from administrative and judicial acts should be covered whether by a direct way which includes extending 
the definition of change in law to stipulate that is contains any change in the manner in which a law is construed, 
evaluated, applied or administered by any government authority, or by an indirect way, through the definition of 
law.  For instance, in the indirect way law can be defined as follows:   
Law means any statute, code, regulation or other written law enacted by the State or other government authority 
(including with respect to taxation and fiscal matters), or any decision, judgment or order issued by the State or 
 
1 Ibid,120 
2 A. F. M. Maniruzzama, “ Drafting Stabilisation Clauses in International Energy Contracts: Some Pitfalls for the Unwary”(2007) 5 /2 Oil, Gas 
& Energy Law Intelligence < https://www.ogel.org/article.asp?key=2498  > accessed 8 March 2020  
3 Ibid   
4 Ibid 
5  Sam Luttrell and Amanda Murphy, ‘Stabilisation Provisions in Long-Term Mining Agreements’ (Global Arbitration Review)< 
https://globalarbitrationreview.com/chapter/1194142/stabilisation-provisions-in-long-term-mining-agreements > accessed 7 March 2020 
6 Ibid 
7 Ibid 
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other government authorities or other capable executives, judicial or administrative bodies.  
In a stabilisation clause, typically a consultation or negotiation process is formed, the object of which is to prevent 
disputes rather than to resolve disputes, it must clearly state how this process is begun. Usually phrases of ‘request 
for negotiations’ or ‘request for consultations’ and sometimes ‘notice of change in law’ are used in the clause. The 
two key issues to consider in making the contractual framework for these notices are timing and content. While it 
may be enticing to see the notice provision as a mere formality, it must be realised that the notice provision actually 
has a significant functional dimension, as it is connected to the trigger. For this reason, the notice provision should 
be paid proper attention in the drafting process.1  
Another important part of the stabilization clause is the procedure for negotiation. In drafting the clause, parties 
should be obligated to a procedure for finding manners to address the effect of the change in the law that has been 
notified by the international oil company. It is vital that the clause specifies the part of the host State that will 
participate in negotiations and determines a time frame in which the discussions must begin ( the deadline for 
completion of negotiations can be determined in another clause which provides the parties with the right to refer 
the conflict to dispute resolution if the negotiations are failed).2  
 
2.2 The Application of Stabilisation Clauses in KRI’s PSCs  
After presenting a clear understanding of the stabilization clause, this section seeks to evaluate the clause in two 
KRI’s PSCs. With regard to stabilisation clauses in the first PSC, there is Article 43 (Governing law, fiscal stability 
and amendments) which provides international oil companies with legal and fiscal stability as following: 
Fiscal Stability  
43.2 The obligation of the CONTRACTOR in respect of this contract shall not be changed by the 
GOVERNMENT and the general and overall equilibrium between the Parties under this Contract shall 
not be affected in a substantial and lasting manner.  
43.3 The GOVERNMENT guarantees to the CONTRACTOR, for the entire duration of this contract, that 
it will maintain the stability of the legal, fiscal and economic conditions of this contract, as they result 
from this contract and as they result from the laws and regulations in force on the date of signature of this 
contract. The CONTRACTOR has entered into this contract on the basis of the legal, fiscal and economic 
framework prevailing at the Effective Date. If, at any time after the Effective Date, there is any change 
in the legal, fiscal and/or economic framework under the Kurdistan Region Law or other law applicable 
in or to the Kurdistan Region which determinately affects the CONTRACTOR, the CONTRACTOR 
Entities or any other Person entitled to benefits under this contract, the terms and conditions of the 
Contract shall be altered so as to restore the CONTRACTOR, the CONTRACTOR Entities or any other 
Person entitled to benefits under this contract to the same overall economic position (taking into account 
home country taxes) as that which such Person would have been in, had no such change in the legal, fiscal 
and/ or economic framework occurred.   
43.4 If the CONTRACTOR believes that its economic position, or the economic position of a 
CONTRACTOR Entity or any other Person entitled to benefits under this Contract, has been 
determinately affected as provided in Article 43.3, upon the CONTRACTOR’s written request, the Parties 
shall meet to agree on any necessary measure or making any appropriate amendments to the terms of this 
Contract to reestablishing the equilibrium between the Parties and restoring the CONTRACTOR, the 
CONTRACTOR Entitles or any other Person entitled to benefits under this Contract to the position 
(taking into account home country taxes) it was in prior to the occurrence of the change having such 
detrimental effect. Should the parties be unable to agree on the merit of amending this Contract and /or 
on any amendments to be made to this Contract within ninety (90) days of the CONTRACTOR’s request 
(or such other period as may be agreed by the Parties), the CONTRACTOR may refer the matter in 
dispute to arbitration as provided in Article 42.1, without the necessary of first referring the mater to 
negotiation and mediation.     
43.5 Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the CONTRACTOR shall be entitled to the 
benefit of any future changes to the petroleum legislation or any other legislation complementing, 
amending or replacing it. 3 
Through reading Article 43 in the first example of KRI PSCs, it appears that the type of stabilisation clause is a 
combination of freezing and economic equilibrium clauses, therefore, it is a hybrid stabilisation clause. The Article 
states that the government will not change the obligations of the IOC and maintains the stability of legal, fiscal 
and economic conditions of the contract within the whole lifetime of the contract. It clearly shows how to trigger 
the stability clause and explains the negotiation procedure between parties by written request from the IOC, it also 




3 The Production Sharing Contrac, Dohuk Block (2008) between the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq and DNO Iraq As, Art. 43 
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In the case of failing to amend the contract, the contractor may refer the matter in dispute to arbitration without 
the necessity of first referring the mater to negotiation and mediation. Thus, it could be noted that the stabilisation 
clause in KRI’s PSCs is in the interest of oil and gas companies more than the government. The scope of 
stabilisation clause is unlimited and there is not any exception.  
In the second KRI’s PSC Article 43 (Fiscal Stability) stipulates:  
GENERAL  
43.1 The Government shall maintain the stability of the fiscal conditions of this Contract, as they result 
from Applicable Law in force as of the Effective Date, for the entire duration of this Contract in 
accordance with this clause 43.  
43.2 The provisions of the clause 43 do not apply to Government Interest Holders.   
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF FUTURE LAWS 
43.3 The Contractor acknowledges that the Government has advised it may propose Laws which could 
have a beneficial or detrimental effect upon the fiscal position of the Contractor, including Laws the 
primary purpose of which may be: 
(a) the protection of the environment to the standards of the European Union; 
(b)  the promotion of the health and safety of citizens of the Kurdistan Region to the standards of the 
European Union;  
(c) the promotion of the health and safety of personnel engaged in Petroleum Operations to the standards 
of the European Union; 
(d) the regulation of hazardous substances, including the transportation and disposal thereof, to the 
standards of the European Union; 
(e) decommissioning of petroleum facilities, including Wells and refineries, to the standards of the 
European Union and Alberta, Canada;  
(f) regulation of pipelines; and  
(g) the regulation of companies.  
The introduction of such Laws will not entitle the Contractor or any Contractor Entity to any rights to any 
alteration to the terms of this Contract.   
CHANGE OF TAX LAW 
43.4 If, at any time after the Effective Date: 
(a) there is any change to Regional Tax Laws in force on the Effective Date (“Change Tax Law”); and  
(b) the fiscal position of the contractor Entities under this Contract is materially either beneficially or 
detrimentally affected by such Change of Tax Law; then  
(c) the Contractor and the Government shall negotiate to alter the terms of this Contract so as to place the 
Contractor Entities in the same overall economic position (taking into account home country taxes) as 
that which the Original Contractor Entity (“Original Contractor Entity” means Deposal) would have been 
without any Change of Tax Law. 
43.5 The Government will under no circumstances be liable to any Party or Person for any consequential 
or indirect losses because of any change of Tax Law.1   
   From this clause in the KRI’s PSC, it appears that the stabilisation clause is a Hybrid Stabilisation clause. It 
combines freezing and economic equilibrium clauses. In general, it has been designed well, the scope of the clause 
is limited and some laws and regulations have been excepted from stabilisation. It also addresses the negotiation 
to amend the contract.     
 
2.3 Stabilisation Clause Comparison 
To evaluate further stabilisation clauses in KRI’s PSC, this section provides a comparison of the clause with 
stabilisation clauses in certain countries’ PSCs.  
a) Indonesia PSCs  
In the Indonesia PSC, which is taken as a sample, the stablisation clause could not be found. Thus, there is no 
stabilisation clause in the contract.  
b) Nigerian PSC  
In the Nigerian PSC, similar to the KRI’s PSCs, there is the stablisation clause, Article 27(Changing in Legislation) 
states:  
27.1 The Parties agree that the commercial terms and conditions of this Contract are based on the existing 
fiscal terms in accordance with the provision of the Deep Offshore and Inland Basin Production Sharing 
Contracts Act, 1999 and the fiscal terms as contained in clause 16 of this Contract. If such fiscal terms 
changed, the Parties agree, subject to clause 27.2, to review the terms and conditions of this Contract 
 
1 Production Sharing Contract, Piramagrum Block, 2011, between The Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq and Repsol YPF Oriente Medio 
S.A, Clause. 43 
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affected by such changes to align such terms and conditions with the fiscal terms.  
27.2 If any time or from time to time there should be a change in legislation or regulation which materially 
affects the commercial benefits afforded the Contractor Parties under this Contract, the Parties will 
consult each other and shall agree to such amendments to this Contract as are necessary to restore as near 
as practicable such commercial benefits which existed under the Contract as of the Effective Date.1   
Thus, in the same way as the KRI’s PSC, there is the fiscal stability clause titled (changing in Legislation) in the 
Nigerian PSC. However, its type is an economic equilibrium clause, because it attempts to restore affected 
commercial benefits of contractor in the case of changing legislation rather than freezing legislation.    
 In contrast to the KRI’s PSC, the Nigerian PSC is not precise in the negotiation procedure and timing to reach an 
agreement to make amendment the contract in order to restore commercial benefits of the contractor. It also does 
not address the case of the failure by parties to amend the contract.       
c) Other Countries  
Exploration and production contracts of Mauritania provide a good example for stabilisation clause. An 
exploration and production contract between The Islamic Republic of Mauritania and Kosmos Energy Mauritania 
in Article 26 (Applicable Law and Stabilisation of Terms) states: 
26.2 The Contractor shall be subject at all times to the laws and regulations in force in the Islamic 
Republic of Mauritania.  
26.3 No legislative or regulatory provision occurring after the Effective Date of the Contract may be 
applied to the contractor which would have as a direct or an indirect effect to diminish the rights of the 
Contractor or to increase his obligations under this Contract and the legislation and regulations in force 
upon the Effective Date of this Contract, without the prior agreement of the Parties.  
However, it is agreed that the Contractor cannot, with reference to the preceding paragraph, oppose the 
application of the legislative and regulatory provisions which are generally applicable, adopted after the 
Effective Date of the Contract, in the matter of safety of persons and of protection of the environment or 
employment law.2 
The Stabilisation clause in this contract is different from many other PSCs. It begins with binding the contractor 
to the laws and regulations in force at all times in Mauritania. Then, the clause states that legislative or regulatory 
provisions occurring after the effective date of the contract which have a direct or an indirect effect to diminish 
rights of the contractor may not apply to the contractor without the prior agreement of the Parties. Thus, in this 
case, the prior agreement is needed. This clause also is not unlimited and there are exceptions such as the matter 
of safety of persons and of protection of the environment or employment law.  
The PSC of Malawi is another effective example for stabilisation clause.  In Clause 49 (Stability Period) it 
stipulates:  
49. 3 The Government guarantees to the Contractor, for the entire duration of this Agreement, that it will 
maintain the stability of the fiscal and economic conditions of this Agreement, as they result from this 
Agreement and as they result from the laws in force on the Effective Date. The Contactor has entered into 
this Agreement on the basis of the legal, fiscal and economic framework prevailing at the Effective Date. 
If there are any changes with respect to any provisions of any law which may detrimentally and unfairly 
affect the Contractor’s economic position during the Stability Period, this Agreement shall be amended 
as may be necessary to restore the Contractor to the economic position it would have enjoyed during the 
Stability Period but for such changes.  
49.4 If the Contractor believes that its economic position has been detrimentally and unfairly affected as 
provided in clause 49.3, upon the Contractor’s written request, the Parties shall meet to agree on any 
additional necessary measures with a view to re-establishing the economic equilibrium between the 
Parties and restoring the Contractor to the position it was in prior to the occurrence of the change having 
such detrimental effect. Should the Parties be unable to agree on the merit of amending this Agreement 
and/or on any amendments to be made to this Agreement within ninety (90) days of Contractor’s request 
(or such other period as may be agreed by the Parties), the Contractor may refer the matter in dispute to 
arbitration as provided in Clause 48. 3      
In the PSC of Malawi, the stabilisation clause similar to KRI’s PSCs is a hybrid stabilisation clause. Firstly, it 
freezes the laws for the entire duration of the contract and then it requires amendment of the contract in the case 
of changing laws that causes detrimentally and unfairly affect the Contractor’s economic position during the 
Stability Period. The Clause provides a clear procedure for the parties to meet and amend the contract during a 
determined period. In the case of failure to amend the contract, it requires to refer this dispute to arbitration. 
However, as the same first example of KRI’s PSC this clause is unlimited and no exceptions are identified in the 
 
1 Production Sharing Contract, Covering Block 905 Anambra Basin, in 2007, between Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and 1. Gas 
Transmission and Power Limited, 2. Energy 905 Suntera Limited, 3. Ideal Oil and Gas Limited, Clause 27    
2 Exploration and Production Contract, Block 6, 2006, between The Islamic Republic of Mauritania and Kosmos Energy Mauritania,  Art.26  
3 Production Sharing Agreement for Block 6 in 2014 between the Government of the Republic of Malawi and Pacific Oil Ltd, Clause 49 
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contract.        
 
3. Renegotiation Clauses in KRI’s Oil and Gas Contracts 
In the previous section, it has been seen that IOCs have genuine concerns about protecting their investments and 
usually insert stabilisation clauses into their contracts as a barrier against state intervention with their investment.  
However, these clauses do not offer the host State sufficient flexibility to change the terms and conditions of their 
contracts. The rigidity of oil and gas contracts containing stabilisation clauses could be the main sourceof disputes 
between host States and IOCs. In an oil and gas contract, the IOC requires stability, while the host State requires 
flexibility.  As a consequence of this, to guarantee the long-term contract, additional mechanisms are required to 
maintain the sovereign prerogatives of the State as well as protecting the legitimate commercial expectations of 
the IOC. These additional contractual mechanisms could come in the manner of renegotiation clauses, which 
permits the parties to review and renegotiate certain terms either at specific intervals or at the occurrence of certain 
trigger events. The insertion of such clauses helps the parties to escape from the inflexibility that usually associated 
with contracts containing stabilization clauses.1  This section seeks renegotiation clauses in KRI’s PSCs and. For 
this purpose, it provides an overview of renegotiation clauses and compares the clause in KRI’s PSCs with some 
countries’ PSCs.    
 
3.1 An Overview of Renegotiation Clauses 
This sub-section defines the stabilisation clauses and determines their types and consequences. It also makes the 
difference between renegotiation and stabilisation caluses. Then it explains the reasons behind renegotiation 
clauses and requirements for triggering these clauses. It also makes guidance for drafting these clauses.       
3.1.1 Definition of Renegotiation Clauses 
In a long-term contract, parties need to predict circumstances that may change the contractual equilibrium and 
consider mechanisms to confront them. In such a contract, the parties could insert certain clauses to protect the 
contract with changing circumstances and make it more flexible in which the renegotiation clause could be one of 
these clauses. Different terms have been used for renegotiating contracts, such as review2, revision3, adaptation4, 
adjustment5 and modification. However, it is preferred to use the renegotiation.    
The renegotiation clause has been defined in several ways, for instance:  ‘Renegotiation clauses are provisions in 
contracts that, upon the happening of a certain event or events, require all parties to return to the bargaining table 
and renegotiate the terms of their agreements’.6 Renegotiation clauses also could be defined as contractual clauses 
that protect contracting parties by making a contract flexible and dynamic during its lifetime, to adapt it to 
changing circumstances and, more especially, to restore the equilibrium of the contract.   
3.1.2 Types of Renegotiation Clause  
Renegotiation clauses can be divided into two categories: 1- Traditional Renegotiation clauses 2- Modern 
Renegotiation clauses  
3.1.2.1 Traditional Renegotiation Clause 
a) General Renegotiation Clauses  
General Renegotiation clauses specifically determine the aim of renegotiation of terms which most frequently 
is to return each of the parties to their position before the change of the legal environment surrounding the 
contract.7 General renegotiation clauses influence the whole substance of the investment agreement. They 
provide conditions under which the whole bargain may be reopened.  For example, the Haitian Petroleum 
Agreement of 1979 provides the following clauses: 
It Is agreed that the terms of this contract shall, upon the request of either party, be subject to renegotiation 
after seven (7) years from the date of pay-out or ten (10) years after the year end in which commercial 
production is reached, whichever time is late – provided however, that in no event shall ‘renegotiation’ 
be deemed to be tantamount to termination. Rather ‘renegotiation’ shall be deemed to reflect the 
opportunity of the parties to adjust the economic terms and conditions of this contract to account for the 
then local and international conditions.8  
According to this clause, the contracting parties have an obligation to renegotiate within the determined time. The 
 
1 Sangwani Patrick Ng’ambi, Resource Nationalism in International Investment Law (Routledge 2016) 130 
2 Joachim Frick, Arbitration in Complex International Contracts ( Kluwer Law International 2001)157 
3 Abdullah Al Faruque, “Renegotiation and Adaptation of Petroleum Contracts: The Quest for Equilibrium and Stability” (2008) 9 The Journal 
of World Investment & Trade113  
4 John Y Gotanda, “ Renegotiation and Adaptation Clauses in International Investment Contracts, Revisited” (2003) 36 /4 Vanderbilt Journal 
of Transnational Law 1461 
5 Robert Scott, “Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts” (1987 )75 California Law Review 2005 
6 Gotanda,loc,cit.  
7 Bertrand Montembault, ‘The Stabilisation of State Contracts Using the Example of Oil Contracts. A Return of the Gods of Olympia’ (2003) 
International Business Law Journal 593   
8 Service Contract, 1979,  between the Haitian State and Anschutz Oversea Corporation, Article 3.3  
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obligation of parties begins either at the happening of a specific event or at regular intervals.  
b) Specific Renegotiation clauses  
 This type of renegotiation clause in contracts refers to a specific event or matter. For instance, the production 
agreement in 1974 between the Government of Ghana and Shell Exploration and Production Company of Ghana 
contains the below clause: 
It is hereby agreed that if during the term of this agreement there should occur such changes in the 
financial and economic circumstances relating to the petroleum industry, operating conditions in Ghana 
and marketing conditions generally as to materially affect the fundamental economic and financial basis 
on this Agreement, then the provisions of this Agreement may be reviewed or renegotiated with a view 
to making such adjustments and modifications as may be reasonable  having regard to the Operator’s 
capital employed and the risks incurred by him always provided that no such adjustments or modifications 
shall be made within 5 years after the commencement of production of petroleum in commercial 
quantities from the production area and that they shall have no retroactive effect.1  
In this clause, the triggering event is explicitly defined. It has also determined standards regarding the degree of 
change in circumstances.  The clause covers changes in economic and financial circumstances in the petroleum 
industry. Apart from this, it clarifies when the contract adjustments or modifications can occur.  
This type of renegotiation clause executes only by occurring of specified triggering event or events that stipulated 
in the clause. This can be considered a limitation of renegotiation clauses. Concerning specific renegotiation 
clauses, parties cannot ask for renegotiating outside of specified events. In contrast, general renegotiation clauses 
may encourage the parties to request a renegotiation of the contract on flimsy grounds thereby threatening the 
stability of the contract.2     
3.1.2.2 Modern Renegotiation clauses ( Economic Equilibrium Clauses) 
Equilibrium clauses as explained and mentioned in the section two, are a type of renegotiation clauses as well. 
They are a combination of Stabilisation and renegotiation provisions. 
3.1.3The Scope of Contract Change by Renegotiation Clause  
Renegotiation clauses usually comprise of a guideline as to the extent of the contract change. The significance of 
this issue stems from the fact that it will determine the result to be achieved by the renegotiation process. The 
Vietnam production sharing agreement is an effective example to indicate the extent of contract change. It requires 
the parties to consult each other and “make the necessary change to ensure that the contractor is restored to the 
same economics which would have prevailed if the new law and/or regulation or amendment had not been 
introduced”3. 
The extent of contract change in the renegotiation clause could be appropriately restricted by limitations such as 
the passage of a certain number of years in advance of any renegotiation phase can take place or if the clause 
excludes a specific outcome such as the exclusion of any retroactive outcome. Finally, the extent of contract change 
can extend to the compensation of the contractor for any loss or damages resulting from the implementation of 
new laws or changes in current regulations.4 
3.1.4 Difference between Renegotiation and Satabilisation Clauses  
Renegotiation clauses allow flexibility and permit changes in the contract. However, classical stabilization clauses 
establish a fixed legal regime by home State throughout the duration of the contract.5  In an oil and gas contract, 
the tendency of IOCs for stability in contractual relations and the demand of host government of developing 
countries for a more flexible contractual regime can be a major source of a conflict between them.6   
Renegotiation clauses do not threaten the host State’s sovereign prerogatives. They make the possibility of 
renegotiation of certain terms of the contract at specified times or on the occurring of specified circumstances.  In 
contrast, classical stabilisation clauses restrict the legislative power of the host State to apply new laws and 
regulations to the detriment of the IOC and by this threat the host State’s Sovereign prerogatives. 7    
3.1.5 Reasons for Renegotiation Clauses  
 The most important reasons for renegotiation clause in oil and gas contracts in brief are:  
a) Oil and gas contracts are long-term contracts  
 
1 The Petroleum Production Agreement, 1974, between the Government of Ghana and Shall Exploration and Production Company of Ghana 
Ltd, Article 47  
2 Bede Nwete, ‘To What Extent Can Renegotiation Clauses Achieve Stability and Flexibility in Petroleum Development Contracts?’ (2006)  
International Energy Law and Taxation Review 56 
3 The Production Sharing Contract of 19 August 1992 for offshore Block 04-2 between the Vietnam National Oil and Gas Corporation of the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Lasmo Vietnam Ltd. & C. Itoh Energy Development Co., Ltd. Art. 17.8   
4Shapur Farhangpur, ‘Analytical Study of Arbitration Under International Oil and Gas Agreements Disputes under the Indian, Iranian and 
International Trade Law: Problems and Prospects’ (DPhil Thesis, University of Pune 2011) 303  
5  Talal Abdulla AL-Emadi, “The Renegotiation Clause in Petroleum International Joint Venture Agreements” 2012. 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2073340 , accessed 20 March 2010  
6 Samuel Asante, “Stability of Contractual Relations in the Transactional Investment Process” (1979)28 International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly 401 
7 Piero Bernardini, “The Renegotiation of the Investment Contract” (1998)13 Foreign Investment Law Journal 411 
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In the oil and gas industry, the commitment of huge capital for exploration and development, and the assumption 
of considerable risk, in particular in exploration, require contracts of a very long time. As long-term contracts are 
needed to make IOCs assume the risk (in exploration, a risk of failure in most of the projects), these long-term 
contracts are then exposed for a long duration to developments the occurrence of which and the impact of which 
on the contract are frequently hard to forecast. A long-term investment is typically made based on assumptions 
concerning the geology of the area, costs of inputs, labour and other payments (e.g. taxes and royalties to the 
government) and the cost of complying with environmental requirements. In the duration of the contracts, certain 
unexpected changes may occur and impact the economics of the project and make pressure on the parties to amend 
the contract via renegotiation.1 Therefore the long duration of oil and gas contracts, is a reason for inserting the 
renegotiation clause.  
b) Investment Risks  
Oil and gas contracts are subject to several significant risks and uncertainties within their duration which can lead 
parties to ask the renegotiation. For instance:2  
1) Change in Geology and Economic Balance of the Project 
An unexpected rise or decrease in prices of natural resource production on the international market can have a 
significant impact on the economic balance of the project and lead the contracting parties to renegotiations. 
Likewise, the unexpected discovery of huge petroleum reserves, or changes in technology which decrease the cost 
of developing the project, may also lead the host government to demand renegotiation, as may the foreign investor 
following an unsatisfactory find in a hostile geographical environment. 
2) Change of Laws and Regulations  
IOCs in oil and gas contracts demand stable investment conditions. Therefore, most of their contracts contain the 
stabilization clauses. IOCs aim to freeze the obligations arising from the laws and regulations at the time of 
concluding the contract through inserting stabilisation clauses and the host State should not be able to change the 
existed balance at the time of concluding the contract by changing the existed laws and regulations or by issuing 
new laws and regulations. Notwithstanding the inclusion of stabilisation clauses in oil and gas contracts, host States 
often change some laws and regulations which could change the existed economic balance of the project at the 
time of concluding the contract. Thus, issuing unpredictable regulations by host States or International conventions 
could hurt the economic balance of the project and significantly change the economic conditions of oil and gas 
projects. In such a situation to continue the project, the contracting parties need to renegotiate the contract. In such 
a case, renegotiation, as a flexible act amends the contract and reduces the possibility of conflicts.  
3) The Environmental Risk  
A long-term oil and gas project may pose a serious risk to the environment. the influence of environmentalists may 
force  cancellation or suspension of a project which is considered as likely to cause serious damage to the 
environment, to the disadvantage of parties to the contract who might have invested a considerable sum of cash 
into the project. Emerging new national or international environmental standards and regulations after the 
concluding oil and gas contracts, may add cost to a project which was not considered by the parties at the time of 
the agreement.3 This frequently occurs in developing countries where environmental regulations are not well 
established, and more often, they are issued in response to one environmental disaster or another which is 
publicized and adopted by some powerful environmental pressure groups (domestic or international). When an oil 
and gas contract confronts the environmental risks, salvaging the project may require a review of the contract by 
the parties in order to address those environmental concerns.4 
4) Change in government  
 The change in government per se may not offer any legal basis for renegotiating a contract entered into by 
the previous government. However, in international business, a change of regime (particularly if brought about 
through a coup d’état, revolution or other drastic measures) does put pressure on contractual relations in 
international business and most commonly is used by the new government as one of the reasons for attempting 
to renegotiate an agreement signed by its predecessor, particularly when circumstances surrounding the initial 
contract are blemished by assertions of corruption, incorrect procedure or abuse of office by the previous 
regime.5  
c) Creating early opportunity to resolve disputes 
The considerable change in the economic balance of the contract may lead it to the disadvantage of one of the 
contracting parties and creates contractual disputes.  In order to prevent the risk of referring disputes to courts or 
arbitrations, the parties should always consider renegotiation. Initially, the parties need to identify the risk of 
 
1 Abba Kolo & Thomasa W. Walde, “Renegotiation and Contract  Adaptation in International Investment Projects: Applicable Legal Principles 




5 Ibid.  
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changing circumstances and instead of predicting all probabilities and referring the issue to courts and arbitration, 
they should determine a process to confront these risks within the contract.1 Renegotiation clauses provide parties 
with an appropriate opportunity to resolve the disputes. This opportunity will be the first entry to summon the 
parties and give them the possibility for the adaptation of the contract. Thus, the renegotiation makes contractual 
relations more flexible. It is a rational way for both governments and IOCs in oil and gas contracts to salvage the 
risk of an otherwise failing project, which has serious negative consequences for parties when the project can be 
salvaged by suitable adaptation.         
3.1.6 Consequences of Renegotiation Clauses  
In the renegotiation process of an oil and gas contract, the parties will succeed or fail. The effective renegotiation 
of an oil and gas contract leads to the modification of the contract by changing the terms or restructuring of the 
contract and therefore, renegotiation makes the contractual relationship more sophisticated. The effective 
renegotiation also has benefits for host governments and IOCs. 
 The successful renegotiation may bring the following benefits to the host government: financial- increasing 
economic benefits from the project; political-restructuring of contract and control over the management; 
social benefits-increased employment opportunities, training of local forces, participation of the local 
community in decision making process, sharing of profits of community, protection of environment and 
technology transfer etc. The renegotiated terms of the contract may be beneficial to the IOCs by preserving 
the contractual equilibrium through ensuring the anticipated benefits from the project. The renegotiated 
settlement may not only be beneficial to the parties in the present context of contract but also it may have a 
positive impact upon the future relationships between the parties.2 
The main issue of contract adaptation is the goal of equity and fairness in the contractual outcome. In a long-term 
contract that the economic balance has been changed, the renegotiation may bring equity and fairness in the 
contractual outcome. 
Renegotiation of an oil and gas contract in a changed economic and social context could decrease the scope of 
political risks, because by the renegotiation of the contract in cases of a change of circumstances, the host State 
commits itself to conduct negotiations with the IOC instead of taking unilateral action. The successful 
renegotiation provides the parties with a reasonable solution which finally facilitates stability in the contractual 
relationship by advancing confidence, trust and reliability between them.3 
However, in the renegotiation process, sometimes the parties do not reach an agreement. With concern to the 
failure of renegotiation, the practice of oil and gas contracts on renegotiation offers no clear guidance. The duty of 
Parties in renegotiation clauses is their best effort to reach an agreement. Thus, parties are required to do their best 
to pursue successful negotiation in good faith, but they are not required to reach an agreement. In the failed 
renegotiations, it is a substantial principle that failure to reach an agreement is not a breach of contract.4 The failed 
negotiation does not raise any responsibility if the parties have negotiated in good faith. But, the failed negotiation 
can be considered as a breach of contract only if it is proved that one of the parties has not acted in good faith.5 In 
the end, if the parties do not reach an agreement by the renegotiation, often oil and gas contracts directly refer the 
issue to arbitration.   
3.1.7 Requirements for Triggering the Renegotiation Clause 
Many oil and gas contracts determine triggering events in the contract to define the scope of renegotiation in 
advance. The types of triggering events may differ from a contract to another depending upon the parties' ability 
to foretaste the potential problems.6 Any renegotiation clause has its conditions that need to be met before the 
renegotiation phase can start. The imposition of laws or regulations the implementation of which harmfully affects 
the IOC’s economic benefits could be the trigger of renegotiation. 7Sometimes the trigger of renegotiation can be 
more precise, for instance, the increase in customs or taxes. The latter type of trigger has the advantage of precise, 
but such a renegotiation clause applies only to defined aspects of the contractual relationship. Another requirement 
that can be a trigger of the renegotiation clause is the change in the financial and economic circumstances 
concerning the oil and gas industry, operating conditions in the host State and marketing conditions generally as 
to materially affect the fundamental economic and financial basis of the contract.    
The triggering events need to be under the control of both parties because the control by only one of them 
may lead to disputes. Clearly defined triggering events may prevent an opportunistic renegotiation by restricting 
the free hand of a wide interpretation of the change of circumstances for triggering renegotiation. Therefore, the 
parties need to act in good faith in invoking the triggering events.8 
 
1 Ibid, 22 
2Al Faruque, “Renegotiation and Adaptation of Petroleum Contracts: The Quest for Equilibrium and Stability, op,cit, 133    
3Ibid 
4 Bernardini, “The Renegotiation of the Investment Contract”, op, cit. 419 
5 Al Faruque, “Renegotiation and Adaptation of Petroleum Contracts: The Quest for Equilibrium and Stability, op,cit, 130 
6 Ibid,122 
7  Zeyad A. AL Qurashi , “ Renegotiation of International Petroleum Agreements” (2005) 22 Journal of International Arbitration 261  
8 Al Faruque, “Renegotiation and Adaptation of Petroleum Contracts: The Quest for Equilibrium and Stability, op,cit,123 
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3.1.8 Drafting Renegotiation clause  
As indicated in previous sections, renegotiation in oil and gas contracts could be a consequence of force majeure 
clause, hardship clause or stabilization clause. Moreover, the renegotiation in oil and gas contracts could be 
conducted as a consequence of the renegotiation clause in the contract. Drafting the clause is a crucial subject in a 
successful renegotiation clause within the oil and gas contracts.  In drafting such a clause, parties need to pay 
special attention to several confiscations: 
First, the triggering events and the procedure to be followed by the parties require to be precisely formulated. 
Triggering events need to be defined in the renegotiation clause and should be precise and specifically worded to 
avoid extensive interpretation by any party as well as fears of instability and frequent disputes. ‘The triggering 
events may include a variety of factors-tax increase, specific risk materialises, changes in the financial and 
economic circumstances relating to the petroleum industry or interval of specific time period’.1  
Equilibrium should be struck between flexibility in the definition of triggering events that may result in 
instability and the requirement of concreteness of the definition of events to achieve stability. Thus, events 
triggering the renegotiation should be carefully weighed by the necessity of contract stability so that minor events 
which have no major economic consequences, should not be regarded as triggering events for renegotiation of the 
contract.2 
Secondly, the extent of the contract change on the basis of renegotiation clauses has to be clearly defined. 
Renegotiation clauses frequently include a guideline as to the extent of the contract change. The significance of 
this issue could be realised from the fact that it will determine the result to be reached by the renegotiation process. 
For example, the clause requires the parties to have a consultation and make the necessary change to ensure that 
the contractor is restored to the same economic situations which would have existed if the new law and/ or 
regulation or modification had not been introduced.3    
Thirdly, the renegotiation clauses have to define the obligations and rights of parties through the renegotiation 
process. The clause also should be asked for conducting renegotiation in good faith by the parties.  
 
3.2 The Application of Renegotiation Clauses in KRI’s PSCs  
As explained and indicated earlier, the renegotiation clause is essential in oil and gas contracts and could be a 
crucial mechanism to avoid disputes in such contracts. KRI’s PSCs do not contain the renegotiation clause as an 
independent clause, however, in the contracts, parties are allowed to negotiate as a consequence of stabilisation 
clause as mentioned in the consequences of the clause.  Article 43 (43.3 and 43.4) in the KRI’s PSC shows the 
opportunity for negotiation as a consequence of the stabilisation clause as presented in the section of the 
sabilisation clause in KRI’s oil and gas contracts. As mentioned earlier, the stabilisation in KRI’s PSCs is a hybrid 
stabilisation clause, thus the clause contains freezing and economic equilibrium provisions. Concerning the 
economic equilibrium part of the clause in PSCs of KRI which is analysed in the section of stabilisation clause in 
KRI’s PSCs, it also could be considered a renegotiation clause, because it is a combination of stabilisation and 
renegotiation provisions.  
 
3.3 Renegotiation Clause Comparison 
To analyse the renegotiation clause in KRI’s PSC, this section attempts to compare and contrast the  PSCs of KRI 
with certain countries’ PSCs. 
a) Indonesia PSCs  
As a renegotiation clause, the Indonesian PSC does not contain such a clause, however, section xv (3. Suspension 
of Obligation) 3.3 allows parties for renegotiation as below: 
 The Party whose ability to perform its  obligations  is so  affected  shall  notify  the  other  Party thereof  in  writing,  
stating  the cause and both shall do all reasonably  within their power to remove such cause.   
b) Nigerian PSCs  
The Nigerian PSC allows the parties to negotiate in the event of changing legislation that affects the economic 
balance of the project Article 27 as they are presented in previous sections.  
27.2 If any time or from time to time there should be a change in legislation or regulation which materially 
affects the commercial benefits afforded the Contractor Parties under this Contract, the Parties will 
consult each other and shall agree to such amendments to this Contract as are necessary to restore as near 
as practicable such commercial benefits which existed under the Contract as of the Effective Date.4  
This article permits the parties to meet and amend the contract in the case of changing legislation that affects the 
commercial benefits of the contractor. However, it does not determine the timing for the procedure and there is no 
 
1 ibid, 122 
2 Ibid 
3 AL Qurashi, op.cit.,290 
4 Production Sharing Contract, Covering Block 905 Anambra Basin, in 2007, between Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and 1. Gas 
Transmission and Power Limited, 2. Energy 905 Suntera Limited, 3. Ideal Oil and Gas Limited, Clause 27      
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arrangement for the case of failure of negotiation by the parties.   
c) Other countries’ PSCs  
The Lebanon PSC could be a good example for the renegotiation clause. The Lebanese PSC in Article 28 
(Changing in Laws and Regulations) states:  
2. In the event that the law no 132/2010 (OPR Law), any regulations adopted thereunder (including the 
decree no 10289/2013(PAR), or any other Lebanese laws are modified after the date of this EPA in any 
other manner (except as set forth in the next sentence) that substantially affects the economic or financial 
position of the Right Holders in respect of this EPA, then the Right Holders may notify the Minister and 
the Petroleum Administration that they wish to meet in order to discuss appropriate adjustments to the 
terms of this EPA to preserve such economic or financial position. The Right Holders may not provide 
any such notification if the relevant change in Lebanese law relates to the improvement of health, safety, 
environmental standards consistent with the evaluation of international standards and practices. If any 
such notification is provided, the Right Holders shall, together with such notice, provide an explanation 
in reasonable detail of the manner in which the relevant modifications substantially affect the economic 
or financial position of the Right Holders in respect of this EPA. The Parties shall thereafter engage in 
good faith discussion with a view to agreeing on such adjustments. Neither Party shall have an obligation 
to agree to any adjustment. If such discussions do not produce an agreement within ninety (90) days of 
the commencement of such discussions, then the Right Holders may submit the issue to a sole expert, 
who shall determine the adjustment that is necessary to preserve the economic or financial position of the 
Parties. Any adjustment agreed by the Parties or determined by a sole expert shall be submitted for 
approval by the Council of Ministers, and shall be effective only if such approval is granted.1  
The renegotiation clause in this contract is well-drafted and could be useful for KRI future PSCs. It clearly explains 
the procedure of negotiation for adjustment of the contract in the case of the affected economic and financial 
position of the contractor by changing laws and regulations. The clause is not unlimited and there are some 
exceptions such as the improvement of health, safety, environmental standards consistent with the evaluation of 
international standards and practices. The period of ninety days is determined to reach an agreement and in the 
case of no agreement is produced, the contractor may submit the issue to a sole expert. Any adjustment agreed by 
the Parties or determined by a sole expert needs the approval of the Council of Ministers.      
The PSC of Azerbaijan also is an effective example of a renegotiation clause. In Article 23.2 (Economic 
Stabilisation) stipulates:  
The rights and interests accruing to Contractor (or its permitted assignees) under this Contract and its 
Sub-contractors under this Contract shall not be amended, modified or reduced without the prior consent 
of Contractor. In the event that the Government or other Azerbaijan authority invokes any present or 
future law, treaty, intergovernmental agreement, decree or administrative order which contravenes the 
provisions of this Contract or adversely or positively affects the rights  or interests of Contractor 
hereunder, including any changes in tax legislation, regulations, administrative practice, or jurisdictional 
changes pertaining to the Contract Area, the terms of this Contract shall be adjusted to re-establish the 
economic equilibrium of the Parties, and if following any such adjustment the rights or interests of 
Contractor remain adversely affected (including any adverse effect suffered for the period before this 
Contract adjustment is implemented, if such is not fully compensated by the adjustment), then SOCAR 
shall indemnify the Contractor (and its permitted assignees) for any disbenefit, deterioration in economic 
circumstances, loss or damages that ensue therefrom. SOCAR shall within the full limits of its authority 
use its reasonable lawful endeavours to ensure that the Government will take appropriate measures to 
resolve promptly in accordance with the foregoing principles any conflict or anomaly between such treaty, 
intergovernmental agreement, law, decree or administrative order and this Contract.2  
The article requires the prior consent of the contractor to amend or modify its rights and interests in the contract. 
It states when laws and regulations are changed and the rights and interests of the contractor are affected by this, 
the terms of this Contract shall be adjusted to re-establish the economic equilibrium of the Parties.  The article 
adds, after adjusting the terms, if the rights and interests of the contractor remain adversely affected, the 
government shall indemnify the Contractor for any disbenefit, deterioration in economic circumstances, loss or 
 
1 Exploration and Production Agreement for Petroleum Activities in Block 4, 2018, between the Republic of Lebanon and Total E&P Liban 
SAL, And Eni Lebanon B.V., And NOVATEK Lebanon SAL., Art. 28    
2 Agreement on the Joint Development and Production Sharing for the Azeri and Chirag Fields and the Deep Water Portion of the Gunashli 
Field in the Azerbaijan Sector of the Caspian Sea, 2017, between The State Oil Company of the Republic of Azerbaijan and Azerbaijan (ACG) 
Limited, BP Exploration (Caspian Sea) Limited, Chevron Khazar, LTD, Exxon Azerbaijan Limited, Inpex Southwest Caspian Sea ,LTD., Itochu Oil 
Exploration (Azerbaijan)INC., Ongc Videsh Limited., Statoil  Apsheron As, Turkiye Petrolleri A.O. ,  Art. 23.2  
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damages that ensue therefrom. However, the scope of the clause according to this article seems unlimited, because 
there is not any exception to the clause. Also, there is not a determined period for an agreement to adjust the terms 
of the contract. The article also does not address the situation of no agreement to adjust and modify the terms of 
the contract by the parties to re-establish the economic balance of the project.    
 
4. Conclusion 
In a long-time oil and gas contract, circumstance may change and lead to disputes. There are certain contractual 
clauses that can prevent the contract from arising disputes in the lifetime of the project and play an important role 
to avoid from disputes. Stabilisation and renegotiation clause are two main clauses for dispute avoidance in 
changing circumstances and legislation.  This article has provided a clear understanding of these clauses, via 
defining and explaining their consequences as well as indicating the differences between the clauses. It has given 
essential points to obey and pay attention in drafting the clauses in oil and gas contracts.  
Stabilisation and renegotiation clauses for dispute avoidance in KRI’s PSCs have been studied and compared 
with Indonesian and Nigerian PSCs. Concerning the stabilisation clause in KRI’s PSCS, it is considered that the 
clause is well-drafted. It is a combination of classic and modern stabilisation clauses. This clause states that 
obligations of International Oil Company will not be changed by the government and the Kurdistan Regional 
Government maintains the stability of legal, fiscal and economic conditions of the contract within the whole 
lifetime of the contract. It clearly shows how to trigger the stability clause and explains the negotiation procedure 
between parties by written request from the IOC, it also determines timing which is 90 days from the writing 
request to make an agreement for amendment of the contract.   
Renegotiation clauses are crucial in oil and gas contracts to prevent parties from arising disputes. In KRI’s 
PSCs, the renegotiation clause is absent as a separate clause, however, as consequences of stabilisation clauses in 
the contracts, parties can negotiate and solve their problems. The stabilisation in KRI’s PSCs is a hybrid 
stabilisation clause, thus the clause contains freezing and economic equilibrium provisions. Concerning the 
economic equilibrium part of the clause in PSCs of KRI which is analysed in the second section, could be 
considered a renegotiation clause, because it is a combination of stabilisation and renegotiation provisions.  
It is recommended that Kurdistan Regional Government should review the provisions of stabilisation and 
renegotiation in its PSCs and insert a comprehensive stabilisation clause as well as including the renegotiation 
clause as an independent and effective clause in the future PSCs. It is also suggested further studies in contractual 
clauses to avoid disputes in oil and gas contracts.        
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